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Aim of the Conference 
The aim of the Conference on Financing for Develop-
ment (FfD) was to identify the financial implications of 
the internationally agreed development goals adopted 
during the past development decade and reaffirmed by 
the heads of state and government in the Millennium 
Declaration and to indicate approaches to mobilizing 
additional financial resources. With this aim, the FfD 
Conference represented a further important step in 
international efforts to eliminate poverty in the world 
and to improve the social and ecological conditions in 
which humankind lives. It was not conceived as a 
pledging conference, but sought rather to define a po-
litical position on what can be financed today, what 
agreement can be reached on and what financing prob-
lems require further clarification. 
The holistic approach at the Conference 
The Conference can take considerable credit for having 
examined the whole spectrum of development financ-
ing. This approach stemmed from the realization that 
only if the various sources of finance were considered 
in their entirety could a realistic overview of gaps in 
existing resources and opportunities for mobilizing 
additional resources be obtained. It also prevents ex-
cessive emphasis on individual sources of finance, 
especially ODA, which tends to be modest in scale 
compared to all other domestic and external sources of 
finance. 
The Conference focused on what the Monterrey Con-
sensus refers to as "leading actions": mobilizing do-
mestic financial resources, mobilizing international 
resources, trade, financial and technical cooperation, 
external debt and systemic issues: coherence and con-
sistency of the international monetary, financial and 
trading systems. 
The last of these leading actions was not confined to 
financial questions in the narrower sense, i.e. the con-
tributions of the multilateral development banks or the 
IMF. The discussions centred rather on the basic ques-
tion of how the international financial, monetary and 
trading systems should be shaped to improve the pros-
pects for the process of sustainable development and 
the achievement of the internationally agreed develop-
ment goals. 
A new partnership 
Achieving the internationally agreed development 
goals, especially that of halving the number of people 
living in absolute poverty by 2015, will require not 
only fundamental changes in the views and policies of 
all actors but also an increase in financial resources. 
The developing countries' efforts will need effective 
support from the bi- and multilateral donors, just as, 
conversely, the international community's contributions 
cannot produce the desired results unless they are em-
bedded in responsible policies pursued by the recipient 
countries with the aim of reducing poverty. This phi- 
 
The Conference on Financing for Development (FfD) ended on 22 March 2002 with the adoption by acclama-
tion of the Monterrey Consensus by the heads of state and government in Monterrey, Mexico. The aim of the 
Conference had been to examine the internationally agreed development goals adopted during the past devel-
opment decade, and especially the goal of halving the number of people living in absolute poverty by 2015, for 
their financial implications and to indicate ways of mobilizing the financial resources needed to achieve them. 
The Monterrey Consensus consists of a collection of non-binding and vague declarations of intent. The develop-
ing countries commit themselves to good governance, economic and social reforms and stability-oriented macro 
policies. When and on what scale is left open. Nor does the Monterrey Consensus refer to any targets for in-
creasing domestic resource mobilization. 
The industrialized countries similarly failed to make any specific commitments in Monterrey. They refused to 
discuss the developing countries' trade demands, claiming that they fell within the WTO's terms of reference; the 
framework for debt rescheduling operations continues to be confined to the HIPC countries, and they accepted a 
substantial increase in ODA contributions only in principle, i.e. without any specific commitments or time 
frames. Only the USA's and EU's unilateral declarations at the time the Monterrey Consensus were adopted that 
they would increase their aid by US $ 12bn per annum from 2006 shines a more positive light on the Consensus. 
The reform of the international monetary, financial and trading systems was also reduced to a promise to im-
prove cooperation among the existing international institutions. 
The Monterrey Conference certainly cannot be classed as an historic conference, but in many respects it did 
bring progress where the detail is concerned. This is especially true of the willingness shown by the governments 
of the developing countries during the Conference to accept that they are primarily responsible for their own 
economic and social development and of the industrialized countries' willingness in principle to give the devel-
oping countries a greater say in the various international institutions. The Monterrey Consensus also calls for 
fresh action, for example, to increase ODA effectiveness, to achieve fairer burden-sharing during the manage-
ment of international financial crises, to establish international insolvency law and to strengthen the role of the 
private sector. 
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losophy forms the basis of the Monterrey Consensus 
and the new partnership between industrialized and 
developing countries which it proclaims. 
The new partnership approach also includes closer 
cooperation between the public and private sectors. It 
would be too much to expect government institutions 
to achieve the internationally agreed development 
goals on their own; the active involvement of the pri-
vate sector will also be needed. Government is ex-
pected to create the environment to enable the private 
sector to develop dynamically; the business commu-
nity, including foreign direct investors, are, on the 
other hand, expected to be guided in their investment 
decisions by the principles of corporate governance 
and to take due account of the host country's develop-
ment priorities in their investment thinking. 
Challenges to the developing countries 
When the Monterrey Consensus is analysed to identify 
the areas and tasks posing the most serious challenges 
to the developing countries, it is noticeable that the 
same demands are repeatedly voiced in all the leading 
actions discussed at the Conference: governments must 
create stable political, economic and social conditions 
in their own countries; good governance and owner-
ship must become watchwords of their policies; com-
bating poverty is the overriding goal by which gov-
ernment action must be guided. This will require not 
only stability-oriented macro policies, disciplined 
budgetary and monetary policies and a transparent, 
non-discriminatory and legally unambiguous environ-
ment but also a free-market economic system and so-
cial structures that enable the productive forces of 
groupings in civil society to develop their full potential. 
None of these requirements is new. In the past ten 
years they have increasingly moved centre stage in the 
debate on development policy. But at the Monterrey 
Conference this debate was conducted in the specific 
context of development financing. Reduced to a simple 
formula, the message from Monterrey reads: without 
democracy, the rule of law, economic reforms and 
stability-oriented macro policies the fundamental fi-
nancial straits of the developing countries cannot be 
overcome. 
During the FfD Conference these issues were dis-
cussed in considerable depth and very openly. The 
seriousness with which they were addressed by the 
developing countries was convincing. Very few at-
tempts were made to blame the international environ-
ment for internal errors and constraints. It is to be 
hoped that the Monterrey Consensus will be a turning 
point and that deeds will now follow the many words. 
The New Partnership for Africa's Development repeat-
edly referred to by many of those attending the Confer-
ence can indeed be seen as a positive sign of the devel-
oping countries' greater willingness to accept more 
responsibility. 
Challenges to the industrialized countries 
International trade: The Monterrey Consensus en-
dorses the model of a universal, rule-based, open, non-
discriminatory and equitable trading system. It would 
benefit countries at all stages of development. The 
commitment to liberalize trade is renewed, and the 
decision of the World Trade Organization (WTO) to 
place the developing countries' needs and interests at 
the heart of the work programme it adopted at the 
fourth Ministerial Conference in Doha is welcomed. 
This outcome of the Monterrey Conference fell well 
short of expectations. The developing countries, for 
which revenue from trade is by far the most important 
source of external finance, saw the Conference on 
Financing for Development as a suitable platform for 
improving the conditions for a long-term increase in 
their export earnings. Principal among their demands, 
for example, were unrestricted access for their goods, 
and especially agricultural products, textiles and cloth-
ing, to the markets of the industrialized countries, the 
abolition of all export subsidies in the industrialized 
countries, particularly in the agricultural sector, a re-
view of trade-related intellectual property rights and a 
reform of the WTO aimed at strengthening the devel-
oping countries' role in this organization. In the final 
document these concerns of the developing countries 
are now merely mentioned in a separate paragraph. 
The industrialized countries refused to discuss the 
developing countries' trade demands, claiming that they 
fell within the WTO's terms of reference. What they 
deliberately overlooked is that there was no question of 
negotiation. They had already agreed to most of the 
demands at the previous round of world trade talks, the 
Uruguay Round. Without harming the WTO's mandate, 
they could therefore have agreed in Monterrey to hon-
our without any further delay the commitments they 
had entered into during the Uruguay Round. Their 
failure to do so is one of the most serious disappoint-
ments of the Conference. Nor is there any consolation 
to be found in the industrialized countries' offer to use 
development cooperation to help the developing coun-
tries overcome supply-side constraints in foreign trade. 
Increasing financial and technical cooperation and 
improving its effectiveness: For countries which do not 
yet have access to the international capital markets and 
are uncompetitive in the world markets ODA remains – 
according to the underlying message of the final docu-
ment – an essential source of finance. However, the 
varied uses to which it can be put also make it impor-
tant for other developing countries. The emphasis was 
placed on two aspects during the Conference: increas-
ing the volume of ODA and improving its effective-
ness. 
If the internationally agreed development goals are to 
be achieved, a substantial increase in ODA contribu-
tions is considered necessary. The donor countries 
were not, however, prepared to agree to unequivocal 
commitments. As regards the 0.7 % target, for exam-
ple, all the final document has to say is: "We acknowl-
edge the efforts of all donors, commend those donors 
whose ODA contributions exceed, reach or are increas-
ing towards the targets, and underline the importance 
of undertaking to examine the means and time frames 
for achieving the targets and goals." 
The criticism levelled at this empty compromise, which 
had already been reached in New York in January 2002, 
undoubtedly helped to persuade both the USA and the 
EU unilaterally to announce a substantial increase in 
their ODA contributions in Monterrey. US President 
George W. Bush declared that he would push the US 
Congress to agree to a 50 % increase in US development 
aid (related to core development assistance) in the next 
three fiscal years. This would result in a permanent rise 
in the volume of ODA by US $ 5bn at the end of this 
period, compared to the present level. Through Commis-
sion President Romano Prodi the EU announced that it 
intended to raise its average ODA quota from 0.33 % to 
0.39 % by 2006, with each Member State achieving a 
quota of at least 0.33 %. In all, this is equivalent to an 
annual increase in ODA by US $ 7bn. 
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ODA quotas of some major EU donor countries (2000) 
Spain 
Germany 
France 
Netherlands 
Denmark 
0.24 % 
0.28 % 
0.33 % 
0.82 % 
1.06 % 
These two commitments have taken much of the wind 
out of the sails of the critics of the Monterrey Consen-
sus. Nonetheless, the situation after the Monterrey 
summit cannot be considered satisfactory. For one 
thing, there is no corresponding commitment from the 
largest bilateral donor, Japan; for another, the future 
contributions from the multilateral financial institutions 
remain uncertain. Although the total additional US $ 
12bn committed indicates the likelihood of a positive 
change of trend in ODA contributions, it does not 
guarantee that the internationally agreed development 
goals will be achieved. 
In view of the limited financial room for manoeuvre in 
most donor countries greater attention is to be paid to 
the effectiveness of ODA resources in the coming 
years. There is still too much bureaucracy, too much 
national interest and too little transparency in the sys-
tem of development cooperation. The Conference is to 
be congratulated on referring explicitly to these weak-
nesses and putting forward numerous proposals for 
improving ODA effectiveness. They include proposals 
for further harmonizing the donors' allocation proce-
dures, increasing untied aid and giving the recipient 
countries a greater say in the use of resources and of 
more programme-oriented instruments. 
Indebtedness: The enlarged debt initiative for the 
heavily indebted poor countries (HIPCs) remains the 
framework for debt relief operations. Attempts to grant 
or promise middle-income countries debt relief failed 
because of opposition from the industrialized countries. 
They did, however, reaffirm their desire to bring the 
HIPC initiative to an early and successful conclusion. 
All the HIPCs are, wherever possible, to enjoy the full 
benefits of the debt relief proposals. The current pro-
cedures are to be used as flexibly as possible, and the 
debt relief operations are to be financed with additional 
resources. 
The enlarged HIPC initiative is based on the concept of 
sustainable debt. Views on how this should be defined 
in practice also differed at the Conference. The meth-
odological procedures and assumptions on which past 
analyses have been based are therefore to be reviewed. 
In the future, the analyses will take greater account of 
the possibility of a lasting change in the limits to sus-
tainable debt due to a deterioration of the world econ-
omy, natural disasters or trade shocks. The Monterrey 
Consensus also includes a call for the establishment of 
clear criteria for the management and resolution of 
financial crises to ensure fair burden-sharing between 
the public and private sectors and between creditors 
and debtors. 
Systemic issues: In a world which is growing ever 
closer together a country's development increasingly 
depends on the international environment. The indus-
trialized and developing countries were therefore able 
to agree fairly rapidly that national development efforts 
must be complemented by reforms in the international 
monetary, financial and trading systems. With a refer-
ence to the many reforms which have already been 
launched, it was agreed that further opportunities for 
improvement should be sought pragmatically. Short-
comings were identified in the developing countries' 
participation in the decision-making processes of inter- 
 
national institutions and forums and in the organiza-
tional and institutional structures of the international 
system. 
The demands vehemently put forward by the develop-
ing countries for a greater say in the decisions of the 
international institutions and forums were met with 
formal arguments from the industrialized countries. In 
particular, they refused to negotiate on reforms of the 
international economic order within the United Nations 
system. They referred to the existing mandates of the 
international institutions, which could not be changed 
by decisions taken at the Conference. The Monterrey 
Consensus therefore does no more than name the insti-
tutions concerned and encourages them to take meas-
ures to ensure stronger representation of the developing 
countries within their respective mandates. 
With the aim of making the international system more 
coherent, improved coordination among the multilat-
eral financial, trade and development institutions and 
between these institutions and the United Nations sys-
tem is advocated. In addition, the role of the UN re-
gional commissions and of the regional development 
banks in the regional policy dialogue on macroeco-
nomic, financial, trade and development issues is to be 
promoted. 
Political stakeholders 
The political environment from which the Monterrey 
Consensus emerged was essentially defined by the 
USA (with the backing of Japan, Canada and Austra-
lia), the EU and the Group of 77 plus China. None of 
the other countries or regional groupings had any ap-
preciable influence on the Conference proceedings. 
The dominant actor during the two years of prepara-
tions for the Conference was undoubtedly the USA. At 
first, it utterly rejected the idea of a conference; once it 
could no longer be avoided, the USA first showed a 
destructive interest, then faced up to the Group of 77 
plus China with almost unsurpassable firmness and in 
the end dominated the Conference with a negotiating 
performance that put all the other delegations in the 
shade. The Monterrey Consensus is largely a reflection 
of American interests and views. The US delegation 
also referred to this quite openly as the precondition for 
the US President's attendance of the summit meeting in 
Monterrey. The fact that Japan, Canada and Australia 
supported much of the American negotiating position 
was undoubtedly helpful to the USA, but not decisive. 
The European Union's bargaining strength fluctuated 
sharply during the two-year negotiations. This was 
essentially due to the six-monthly change of EU presi-
dency. It was unfortunate that the representation of the 
EU was extremely weak at the final and decisive phase 
of the Conference. As a result, it was unable to assert 
itself in matters in which its position differs from the 
USA's, as on the 0.7% target and the reform of the 
international system. Had the EU been appropriately 
committed, the whole issue of global public goods 
would certainly not have been removed from the final 
document. 
The Group of 77 plus China similarly demonstrated 
strengths and weaknesses during the negotiations, 
which was partly due to the group's spokesmen. A 
further problem for the G77 plus China was the holistic 
approach adopted at the Conference. Given the wide 
range of different issues, the group hardly succeeded at 
times in blending its members' extremely heterogene-
ous interests into a negotiating position. The fact that 
numerous issues were not discussed during the Confer- 
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ence was not least due to the weakness of the Group of 
77 plus China. Throughout the Conference China was 
highly reticent, primarily because it is unlikely to have 
any financing constraints that can be attributed to a 
shortage of capital. 
Evaluation of the Conference 
The Conference did not achieve its immediate aim of 
analysing the financial implications of the internation-
ally agreed development goals and identifying oppor-
tunities for mobilizing additional resources. The ques-
tion still open or contentious after the Monterrey Con-
sensus is what financial resources need to be mobilized 
in total if the internationally agreed development goals 
are to be achieved and what contribution the various 
sources of finance might make. Nor is this statement in 
any way changed by the promise of an increase in the 
EU's and USA's ODA contributions made in connec-
tion with the adoption of the Monterrey Consensus. 
An evaluation of the Conference on Financing for De-
velopment that considers only the text of the final 
document does not go far enough since it fails to take 
adequate account of the two years of negotiations that 
preceded the Conference. What is important is that the 
Conference is seen as part of an evolutionary process 
in which the aim is to reshape the relationship between 
industrialized and developing countries. Seen from this 
angle, international conferences cannot as a rule be 
evaluated in terms of whether "breakthroughs" are 
achieved or whether milestones or turning points are 
reached. Only a few conferences can claim this for 
themselves. In such terms the Monterrey Conference 
certainly cannot be classed as an "historic" conference 
and placed on a par with the UN's Sixth Special Gen-
eral Assembly in 1974 or the Rio Conference in 1992. 
As a "normal" conference, it must rather be analysed 
and evaluated in terms of whether any movement oc-
curred in individual areas of conflict and negotiation 
during the proceedings. This was undeniably the case. 
Particular emphasis should be placed on two changes 
which may have lasting consequences in the long term. 
First, the Monterrey Conference established in stronger 
terms than any other conference that each country is 
primarily responsible for its own economic and social 
development. The course of the debate during the Con-
ference leaves room for hope that many developing 
countries have accepted this message. For their part, 
the industrialized countries were forced to note that the 
developing countries can no longer be denied a greater 
say in the decision-making processes of the interna-
tional organizations. Although it was not possible dur-
ing the Monterrey Conference to clarify in detail how 
the legitimate interests of the developing countries can 
be safeguarded in the various institutions and where 
the limits to a bigger say lie, the Monterrey Consensus 
increased the political pressure on the institutions con-
cerned to such an extent that they will have to change 
in this respect in the future. 
Besides these two important changes, the Monterrey 
Consensus also reveals many shifts of emphasis in 
certain areas. A particular example of this is the inter- 
 
 
 
 
national community's determination to combat corrup-
tion and cut off the supply of funds to international 
terrorism, to increase the effectiveness of ODA, to 
share the burden more fairly during debt crises, possi-
bly to establish international insolvency law and to 
strengthen the private sector's role in the development 
process. It should not be forgotten that it is often the 
"small" developments which – viewed from an histori-
cal perspective – make a lasting change to the world. 
In one respect the Conference on Financing for Devel-
opment even set new standards: the very broadly based 
participation of the business community and the non-
governmental organizations from the outset. At all 
times both groupings had an opportunity to put forward 
their arguments during the debate. Whether it was 
possible to achieve better results through this broader 
approach may not be the relevant question in the case 
of international conferences. What is more decisive is 
that it was possible in Monterrey to integrate the whole 
range of opinions into the process. 
Many issues were left open or were not considered 
adequately at the Conference on Financing for Devel-
opment. Some observers regarded this as a sign of the 
limited success of the Conference. What they fail to 
see, however, is that not all questions raised by a holis-
tic approach to development financing can be properly 
discussed during a financing conference. In the final 
analysis, however, it can be pointed out to the critics 
that the Monterrey Consensus would not have been 
possible only five years ago. 
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